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Return to SR/2

9 May 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR

SUBJECT : Current Status of AEGOB Exfiltration Plan

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES MEASURED EXEMPTION 3928
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. The status of our REDSKY agents in the Latvian SSR remains the same. Communications have been maintained and the safety signals contained in the traffic received still show every evidence of freedom from control. The money available for their use, however, is being depleted and it is estimated that by early fall 1955 their funds will be exhausted.
2. During the current solar phase there is no longer sufficient darkness available in order to conduct the mission successfully using an L-20 from Gotland. It has been estimated by AMD that the necessary number of hours of darkness will not be available until after 11 August. Although the pilot currently in training has not yet attained the desired level of proficiency, it is the considered opinion of AMD that he will be fully qualified in ample time to be available for the earliest possible mission date of 11 August. In any case, there is another pilot (T-12) currently employed in Greece who is already proficient and will probably be available in August if needed.
3. In an effort to explore all possible means of effecting a maritime exfiltration as an alternative to the air exfiltration, it was determined by AMD that the present Agency maritime assets did not possess the capabilities required in order to successfully carry out the mission. It was further stated that even given the technical capability, it was not considered possible to mount a successful maritime operation staged from Germany because of the Soviet security counter-measures and the factor of available darkness.
4. It was determined that the ZIPPER boat in Germany could not be utilized without dealing directly with the British Service. This would mean that besides German Intelligence being fully informed of the operation, not only would British Intelligence also be informed, but it could probably be relied on to exert at least some degree of control over the operation as well. Steps have been taken to attempt to determine the level of security of British Baltic operations and the extent to which they may be under Soviet control.
5. It has been determined that a Hydrofoil exists in Germany which could probably be purchased immediately; however, as presently outfitted, it falls far short of the desired range and payload capabilities. Steps have been taken to determine whether this Hydrofoil is capable of modification to the extent required in order to execute the operation staging from Gotland.

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6. We have now received quite favorable news from the [] indicating that [] has reversed his original position and now requests authority to proceed with negotiations for Swedish support for an air operation. In the event Swedish support for an air operation can not be secured, it is intended to discuss the possibility of a joint operation in a Swedish boast or some other alternative.

7. Inasmuch as it appears that only an operation launched from Gotland, whether by air or sea, has any major probability of success, it is requested that steps be taken to secure approval for the initiation of negotiations for Swedish support.

[] Chief, SR/2 []

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